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INTRODUCTION
Switzerland is perceived as one of the least corrupt countries in the world based on international rankings.
According to the “Corruption Perception Index” of Transparency International, Switzerland has regularly been
rated among the top eight least corrupt countries since 2009. Even before then, since 1995 in fact, Switzerland has
consistently received good rankings on integrity. 1 However, recent corruption allegations in the world of football,
particularly the cases involving the FIFA World Cup 2018 and 2022, have led to international scrutiny of the
effectiveness of Switzerland’s anti-money laundering and anti-corruption regimes. This issue is particularly
significant for Switzerland, which is home to numerous non-profit organizations and, importantly, many
international sports organizations. Approximately sixty sports organizations are headquartered in Switzerland,
including the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), the
International Ski Federation (FIS), and FIFA. 2
For example, U.S. Attorney Robert Capers, whose office charged the FIFA case in 2015, repeatedly noted that the
United States was determined to fight corruption in the world of sports within and beyond its national borders “to
make room for a new era of integrity and reform.” Capers emphasized late that year, as he announced that
additional FIFA officials had been indicted, that the “work is not done. While our investigation continues at home,
we also look forward to continuing our collaboration with our international partners, including in particular the
Swiss authorities, because there is so much yet to be done.”
Given these statements and others in the press, 3 one might assume that Swiss law does not contain sufficient anticorruption and anti-money laundering laws when compared to other countries, instead serving as a safe harbor for
corruption in the sports sector. I argue in this paper that this assumption is wrong, or at least premature. 4 An
examination of the development of Swiss anti-corruption and anti-money laundering standards demonstrates that
Switzerland has always been actively engaged in fighting corruption both nationally and internationally. While it
cannot be denied that the corruption allegations in connection with the allocation of the FIFA-World Cup 2018
and 2022 revealed certain weaknesses in Swiss law, 5 generally speaking, Switzerland has a comprehensive anticorruption and anti-money laundering regulatory regime, and recent reforms have further enhanced these laws.

RELEVANT SWISS LAWS
In this paper, I focus on the following provisions of Swiss law:
1. Bribery of Swiss public officials (art. 322ter and 322quater Swiss Criminal Code (“SCC”)) and foreign officials
(art. 322septies SCC);
2. Private bribery provisions (which underwent a major revision in 2016). For these purposes, active private
bribery means “any person who offers, promises or gives an employee, partner, agent or any other auxiliary
of a third party in the private sector an undue advantage for that person or a third party in order that the
person carries out or fails to carry out an act in connection with his official activities which is contrary to his
duties or dependent on his discretion” (see new provision in art. 322octies SCC). Similarly, passive private
bribery means that such person “demands, secures the promise of, or accepts” an undue advantage under
the above mentioned circumstances (see wording in art. 322novies SCC).
3. Corporate liability in connection with bribery of foreign officials and active private bribery pursuant to art.
102 para. 2 SCC.
4. Certain anti-money laundering provisions, specifically the definition of “politically exposed persons”
(“PEP”) which was revised in 2016. The new definition now includes politically exposed persons in
international organisations, i.e. “individuals who are or have been entrusted with a prominent function by an
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intergovernmental organization or international sports federations” 6 (see new wording of art. 2a para. 1
letter c Swiss Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA)).

ESCALATION OF CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS IN THE WORLD OF FOOTBALL IN MAY 2015
In 2015, corruption allegations in the world of football burst onto the international scene. Specifically in May 27,
2015, the U.S. Department of Justice issued its first indictment charging fourteen defendants (including several
FIFA officials as well as leading officials of other FIFA-related soccer governing bodies) with racketeering, wire
fraud and money laundering conspiracies, among other offenses. On December 3, 2015 a superseding indictment
followed, charging sixteen additional individuals in the case. These U.S. investigations involved close international
cooperation with Swiss authorities, which, among other things, led to the arrest of several high ranking soccer
officials in Zurich in May and December 2015 as well as orders to numerous Swiss banks to freeze relevant client
accounts. At the same time, the Swiss Attorney General initiated several football-related criminal investigations,
which have so far amounted to approximately twenty-five separate parallel proceedings in Switzerland. 7 Targets of
the investigations include not only high ranking officials of FIFA and officials of other related soccer organizations,
but other involved parties, although FIFA itself (the association) has not been directly implicated in the criminal
proceedings. 8

ANALYSIS OF RECENT REFORMS
Development of Anti-Corruption Standards in Switzerland
Before May 2015:
The debate around improving anti-corruption standards in Switzerland is not a new one. In 1999, the Swiss Federal
Council initiated a major wave of legal reforms of the anti-corruption statutes, emphasizing the need to cooperate
in the fight against corruption on the international level. First, Switzerland got involved in the international fight
against corruption at an early stage by ratifying these international treaties:
1) On March 31, 2000, Switzerland ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”) which encompasses “legally
binding standards to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions.” 9
2) On March 31, 2006, Switzerland ratified the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
which aims to coordinate the criminalization of corrupt practices and to improve the international
cooperation among member states. 10
3) In October 27, 2006, Switzerland ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; 11 and
4) Since September 24, 2009, Switzerland has been a member party of the UN Convention against Corruption,
a comprehensive international legal instrument against corruption. 12
Through these agreements, Switzerland committed itself to improving anti-corruption standards on both the
national and international levels. 13 The Council of Europe’s and OECD’s conventions encompass a monitoring
system which provides for a regular check of the anti-corruption standards of each member state. 14 In 1999, the
Council of Europe established the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) to monitor member states’
compliance with the organization’s anti-corruption standards. On the recommendation of GRECO, Switzerland
introduced the Interdepartmental Working Group on Combating Corruption, which focuses on the development
and implementation of a coherent anti-corruption strategy at both the national and international levels. Moreover,
Switzerland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (in French: le Groupe d’Action Financière sur
le Blanchiment de Capitaux (GAFI)). 15 As such, Switzerland has regularly been evaluated on its compliance with
2

the FATF Recommendations, which are recognized as the international standard for combating money laundering
and the financing of terrorism (the latest (fourth) evaluation report was released in December 2016, see below).
In conjunction with entering into the above treaties, Switzerland also implemented three major criminal law
reforms on the national level:
1) In 2000, against the background of the OECD Convention (and local corruption scandals), Switzerland
conducted the first criminal law reform of its anti-corruption statutes since the enactment of the SCC. 16
While previous criminal statutes focused on combating corruption within national borders, bribery was now
conceived as a transnational regulatory matter. 17 As a consequence, and as an important part of the reform in
2000, Switzerland introduced the criminal offence of active bribery of foreign public officials, which, in
short, sanctions any person who (actively) “offers, promises or gives a member of a judicial or other
authority” of a foreign or international organization an undue advantage in connection with that person’s
official activities (art. 322septies para. 1 SCC; note, however, that the criminal offence of passive bribery of
foreign officials was introduced in Switzerland at a later stage, see below). This first criminal law reform of
anti-corruption provisions was crucial for Switzerland in order to meet the requirements under the OECD
Convention and an important step in the international fight against corruption; 18
2) In October 2003, corporate criminal liability for certain active bribery offences was introduced (art. 102
para. 2 SCC); 19 and
3) In 2006, against the background of Switzerland’s ratification of the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption, the Swiss legislature implemented further reforms which extended the scope of
certain anti-corruption statutes in the following way: Until this point in time, Swiss criminal provisions
against private bribery and bribery of foreign officials had focused on sanctioning active conduct. 20 The
reforms in 2006 brought a change in the scope of these anti-corruption statutes. The Swiss legislature
extended the scope of the above mentioned criminal offence of bribery of foreign public officials to passive
conduct (e.g. the acceptance of bribes by foreign officials). 21 Moreover, Switzerland broadened the scope of
the existing private bribery provision (which was implemented in the Swiss Unfair Competition Act), so that
the latter covered both active and passive forms of bribery in the private sector. 22
Notwithstanding these changes, criticism of the Swiss anti-corruption laws continued with emphasis on the Swiss
approach to private bribery regulation.
Criticism of the Swiss Approach to Private Bribery:
As corruption allegations started to swirl a few years ago in connection with the selection of Russia and Qatar as
2018/2022 FIFA World Cup venues, some commentators criticized Switzerland for weaknesses in its prosecution
of private bribery. 23 Although both active and passive bribery had been criminalized in Switzerland since 2006, the
provisions were derided as weak and it was claimed that the laws actually hindered the prosecutor from being able
to investigate private bribery cases. 24 This criticism was based on the following arguments:
1) The offense of private bribery was not placed in the correct set of laws. While bribery of public officials has
been governed by the Swiss Criminal Code, bribery of private individuals was originally regulated by the
Federal Law against Unfair Competition (“UCA”) (former art. 4a and 23 UCA). 25 The placement of the
private bribery provision in the UCA meant that prosecution of private bribery in Switzerland required,
among other things, that the alleged conduct resulted in a distortion of competition. 26 Unfortunately, the
fact that the offence had to be tied to a distortion of competition led to inconsistent results. 27 For instance,
a person who bribed another individual and, as a consequence, was awarded a contract despite insufficient
qualifications could be held criminally liable under the (former) private bribery provision, because the bribe
affected a situation of competition in the UCA sense. In contrast, a person performing the same conduct
after a contract had been awarded (i.e. bribing the contracting party so that the latter would overlook
insufficient quality standards) would not have fallen under the former provision. 28 This proved to be
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particularly problematic as it related to the sports sector and in corruption cases in connection with the
World Cup. 29 Based on the concept of the Unfair Competition Act, the competing countries for the World
Cup were generally not perceived to be in competition in the UCA sense; as a result, private bribery in these
settings would likely not have fallen within the scope of the (former) private bribery provision. 30 The Swiss
Federal Council identified this inconsistency as a specific weakness in the Swiss approach to private
bribery. 31
2) Another major point of criticism was that private bribery, unlike bribery of public officials in Switzerland,
was originally prosecuted only upon complaint. As a consequence, Swiss prosecutors had no authority to
open criminal proceedings in a case involving bribery among private individuals unless an affected person
decided to file an official complaint. This procedural requirement turned out to be a major obstacle in the
prosecution of private bribery in Switzerland, 32 because often no specific individuals were aware of or
directly injured by the bribery and thus no investigation was initiated. 33 This requirement also offered the
parties who were involved in a private bribery scheme the chance to prevent criminal proceedings by
concluding a private settlement of the case. 34 Not surprisingly, given these problems with the private bribery
law, there were no convictions under that provision in the first eight years that it existed. 35
Major Reforms Proposed in 2014:
1) Stricter Enforcement of Private Bribery: The Swiss Federal Council, the highest executive authority in
Switzerland which has the ability to submit proposed legislation to the General Assembly for approval,
addressed the above-mentioned concerns in its proposal regarding the revision of the private bribery
provision in 2014. Key objectives of reform were to transfer the private bribery provision from the UCA
into the Swiss Criminal Code, and to grant prosecutors the authority to open proceedings without prior
complaint by the affected person. 36
With regard to the first objective, the Swiss Federal Council suggested disconnecting the private bribery
nexus to competition to bring bribery cases in connection with international sports organizations and large
sports events clearly into the scope of the new private bribery provision. The Swiss Federal Council
emphasized the importance of this revision due to the broad financial powers involved in certain
international sports events and their impact on the economy. 37
The second objective, the elimination of the complaint requirement, aimed at strengthening the prosecution
of private bribery and expressed the legislature’s intent to prosecute private bribery based on the public
interest and to put the matter beyond the control of the private parties involved. 38 Hence, private bribery
became an ex officio crime, i.e., the prosecutor does not need to obtain a complaint to prosecute private
bribery anymore. 39
2) More Transparency in Financial Transactions: In addition, in 2014 the Swiss Federal Council proposed
amendments to Switzerland’s anti-money laundering legislation to increase transparency in financial
transactions and the banking sector. 40 These reforms stemmed from the FATF (/GAFI) Recommendations
in 2012, which were aimed at improving regulations on transparency of the beneficial ownership of
corporations, the duty of care of financial intermediaries, and combating money-laundering in connection
with tax evasion, 41 as well as establishing more stringent duty of care provisions for financial
intermediaries. 42 One of the crucial points of the revision was the extension of the definition of “politically
exposed persons.” According to the new provisions, this term encompasses “individuals who are or have
been entrusted with a prominent function by an intergovernmental organization or international sports federations”
(e.g. secretaries general, directors, deputy directors and members of the board or individuals with equivalent
functions). 43 The broadening of the definition obliges banks to apply higher compliance standards when
such persons open or use their bank accounts. 44
4

Assessment of Improvements in Private Bribery Provision:
Despite these improvements, private bribery remains a misdemeanor under Swiss law with a maximum penalty of
three years’ imprisonment. 45 This is in contrast to bribery in the public sector, which carries a maximum penalty of
five years’ imprisonment and, hence, qualifies as a felony. 46
This distinction is also important in the context of money laundering: According to the Swiss criminal statute of
money laundering, the latter is only punishable if the proceeds originate from a “felony” or an “aggravated tax
misdemeanor.” 47 This means that private bribery will not qualify as a predicate offence for money laundering under
Swiss law (as it is a misdemeanor and not a felony). 48 Moreover, the new private bribery provision does not apply
where the person being bribed is a volunteer49 and does not provide for whistleblower protection. 50
After May 2015:
In May 2015, the corruption allegations in the world of football reached their peak as the investigations by U.S. and
Swiss authorities became public. High-ranking soccer officials of FIFA and related soccer governing bodies were
arrested in Zurich in May 2015 and December 2015. 51
On January 1, 2016, the Swiss parliament passed the above-mentioned new money laundering provisions, 52 and on
July 1, 2016, the Parliament enacted the new private bribery provision described previously. 53 The private bribery
reform also broadened corporate liability; corporations may be criminally liable if the unlawful conduct was
committed in the exercise of the business activity that cannot be attributed to any specific individual. 54 And Swiss
organizations can now be held liable for not having taken all reasonable measures in order to prevent active private
bribery within their ranks. 55 This likely will motivate Swiss-based corporations and organizations, including sports
organizations, to strengthen their compliance structures. 56

Remaining Weaknesses?
As shown above, Switzerland has responded to international criticism on the private bribery front with a round of
reforms. The revisions aimed at taking international sports organizations into the scope of the new private bribery
provision. The efficacy of that provision remains to be seen. 57 Despite these reforms and the generally solid Swiss
anti-corruption regime, there is still work to be done. The next reforms in Switzerland will focus on the prevention
and combating of money laundering and on increasing transparency in the area of non-profit organizations
(“NPO”s); these are the areas where the FATF 58 has, in its latest evaluation report of December 2016, identified
shortcomings in certain specific areas. 59 The improvement of the Swiss regulation in these areas is of particular
importance for Switzerland, because of Switzerland’s leading role in the cross-border private banking sector and its
position as a global center for international NPOs. 60
With regard to the NPO sector, the Swiss Federal Council is considering increasing the transparency requirements
for Swiss-based associations and foundations in order to reduce the money laundering and terrorist financing risks.
In this respect, it is important to understand that Swiss law currently provides for a very flexible legal framework
for associations, which is mainly based on self-governance and can be adapted to the specific needs of small as well
as large international associations, 61 while mandatory liability and accounting rules are kept at a minimum in Swiss
association law. 62 Moreover, NPOs in Switzerland, as a general rule (with certain exceptions), do not have to be
registered, nor are they supervised by any supervisory authority. 63 These characteristics of Swiss association law are
in many ways positive as it allows an individual NPO to adapt its structure to the particular needs of its association
and to establish itself without having to overcome high legal burdens. However, according to the Interdepartmental
Working Group on Combating Corruption these factors make the accessibility of information difficult and increase
the money laundering (and terrorist financing) risks in the NPO sector. 64 In the context of the latest FATF Report,
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the Interdepartmental Working Group on Combating Corruption has suggested a regulatory goal of increasing
transparency in the NPO sector by creating a duty of registration and membership disclosure for certain NPOs that
show increased terrorist financing risks. 65
With regard to the anti-money laundering regulations, the Swiss Federal Council intends to focus specifically on
broadening the scope of the due diligence obligations according to the Swiss Anti-Money Laundering Act, which as
of today do not encompass certain non-financial intermediary activities, and improving the Swiss reporting
mechanism of suspicious transactions. The FATF Report of December 2016 identified shortcomings in both of
these areas. 66 The Swiss Federal Council defined its strategy for further regulatory work on the above-mentioned
points on June 28, 2017 and instructed the Federal Department of Finance to prepare a consultation draft.
Switzerland must present its first follow-up report to the FATF in February 2018. 67

CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, Switzerland does not lack a robust anti-corruption and anti-money laundering system.
Moreover, an examination of legal reforms in the anti-corruption sector in Switzerland shows that major legal
reforms took place in Switzerland between 2000 and 2009, indicating that Switzerland had been actively engaged in
the fight against corruption before the escalation of the football-related corruption allegations. This is supported by
international assessments: Switzerland has in general received good grades from different international institutions
concerning its compliance with international anti-corruption standards and is perceived as one of the least corrupt
countries in the world.
At the same time it cannot be denied that the major corruption cases in the world of football have revealed
weaknesses in certain specific areas of the Swiss anti-money laundering and anti-corruption regulations. One major
weakness in the regulation of private bribery has been addressed by the latest reforms in 2016.
There is still room for improvement. The latest assessment of the Financial Action Task Force of December 2016
has revealed remaining weaknesses in: (1) the scope of the due diligence obligations according to the Swiss AntiMoney Laundering Act; (2) the risks associated with the area of non-profit organizations; and (3) certain
deficiencies in the Swiss reporting mechanism of suspicious transactions. On June 28, 2017, the Swiss Federal
Council announced further regulatory work in these areas. Hence, it can be assumed that the next reforms in
Switzerland in the anti-corruption sector will specifically address anti-money laundering regulation and
enforcement, the first reform proposals of which may be expected in 2018.
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